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RETHINKING ABORTION: EQUAL CHOICE, THE 
CONSTITUTION, AND REPRODUCTIVE POLITICS. 
By Mark A. Graber.l Princeton, New Jersey: Princteon 
University Press. 1996. Pp. 244. Hardcover, $24.95. 
Steven D. Smithz 
Rethinking Abortion is a piece of unapologetic "advocacy 
scholarship"-with the emphasis on "advocacy." Pronouncing 
existing arguments unsatisfactory, Mark Graber offers what he 
describes as "a better and more persuasive attack on pro-life pol-
icies than conventional pro-choice broadsides." (p. 193) Gra-
ber's argument-which he calls "equal choice" (p. 6)-is not 
exactly new; as he points out, the argument was prominently pro-
posed and debated in the years before Roe v. Wade, and indeed 
was a principal focus of argumentation in Roe itself. (p. 64) But 
after Roe, the "equal choice" argument pretty much disappeared 
from the public scene. Not pausing to reflect on why pro-choice 
proponents might have chosen to retire the argument from active 
duty, Graber now calls it up again and presents it with gusto. 
"Once Americans are fully exposed to the philosophical and con-
stitutional case for equal choice," he foresees, 
legislators and executives will stop regulating abortion, voters 
will elect large pro-choice majorities, justices will continue (or 
resume) treating Roe as an authoritative constitutional deci-
sion, and opponents of legal abortion will refrain from propos-
ing new bans until their pro-life policies have some reasonable 
chance of being fairly administered. 
(p. 118) 
The bulk of Graber's discussion is presented as legal argu-
ment, and I will focus first and mainly on that aspect of his book. 
But Graber also provides a lengthy prescription for pro-choice 
political action. His political discussion is primarily addressed to, 
and can best be assessed by, pro-choice strategists-a group to 
which I can't pretend to belong-so I will describe that part of 
the book only briefly. Finally, I will note what seem to me some 
major and interesting questions that Graber raises, and indeed 
continually butts up against, but that his chosen purposes do not 
permit him to pursue. 
I. Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Maryland. 
2. Byron R. White Professor of Law, University of Colorado. 
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I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE FOR ABORTION 
RIGHTS 
Given the torrent of legal theorizing about abortion over the 
last two decades or so, one might question whether what the 
world needs now is yet another constitutional argument for abor-
tion rights. Haven't the existing arguments succeeded well 
enough? Sensitive to this doubt, Graber explains that the consti-
tutional debate has largely been carried on in ignorance of the 
relevant social realities. A closer look at those realities, he sug-
gests, leads to two conclusions: first, that the familiar arguments 
both for and against abortion rights are deeply flawed and, sec-
ond, that an alternative "equal choice" argument for such rights 
readily satisfies even conservative understandings of equal pro-
tection. (p. 90) We can consider each of these claims in tum. 
Criticism of existing arguments. "The most influential pro-
ponents and opponents of legal abortion are oblivious to the [rel-
evant] details of contemporary social life," Graber asserts (p. 
37)-they live in a "looking glass world" composed of "pseudo-
empirical claims" (pp. 20-21)-and so his first chapter aims to 
show how their innocence of social realities undermines the fa-
miliar arguments for and against abortion. Occasionally his criti-
cisms seem on point. For instance, the argument that abortion 
restrictions would not have been enacted if legislatures were not 
so heavily dominated by men does seem to be placed in doubt by 
studies showing that on the whole women are more favorable 
than men to restrictions on abortion. (p. 34-35) Graber also de-
votes several pages to showing that Catharine MacKinnon's 
claims about the relative infrequency of truly consensual sexual 
intercourse amount to "bald assertions" wholly unsupported by 
empirical evidence, and that MacKinnon distorts the one study 
she purports to rely on (Kristin Luker's Taking Chances). In fact, 
Graber argues, the study contradicts MacKinnon's views. (p. 30-
33) 
Some of the evidence discussed by Graber might also use-
fully serve to curb the more extreme rhetoric to which advocates 
sometimes resort. For instance, Graber contends that pro-lifers 
greatly overestimate the increase in abortions that resulted from 
Roe (p. 265 nn. 40-42); if he is right, then responsible advocates 
ought to avoid making such claims. He also contends that post-
Roe restrictions both on abortion funding and on abortion itself 
have had very little impact on the actual number or availability of 
abortions (p. 7, 20, 65-69); if so, then some pro-choice rhetoric 
might need to be tempered. 
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For the most part, though, the empirical facts presented by 
Graber seem well shy of startling, and hardly cry out for major 
revisions in the current constitutional debate. For example, Gra-
ber explains to pro-choice advocates that very few of the women 
who choose abortion became pregnant as a result of rape or in-
cest. In addition, complete forbearance from sex is not consid-
ered by American psychiatrists to be a symptom of mental 
disorder. And even people who want to engage in sex can do so 
without risking pregnancy-for example, through permanent 
sterilization. (p. 27) Graber explains to opponents of abortion 
rights that statutes prohibiting abortion have served a variety of 
purposes, not merely the protection of fetal life, that such stat-
utes in the past were rarely enforced, and that the existence of 
prohibitions on the books did not necessarily reflect "a present 
pro-life social consensus." (p. 22-25) It seems unlikely that these 
revelations will set off a crisis in either pro-choice or pro-life 
circles. 
Moreover, a good deal of the discussion in Chapter One 
seems only distantly related to Graber's ostensible purpose of 
showing how existing arguments are undermined by empirical re-
search; instead, Graber seems eager simply to accuse advo-
cates-especially pro-life advocates-of inconsistency, hypocrisy, 
and moral insensitivity. For instance, he repeatedly levels the fa-
miliar charge that pro-lifers are inconsistent or hypocritical be-
cause they do not support government programs for promoting 
contraception or because they regularly oppose government 
spending for welfare measures that might reduce the need for 
abortion. (p. 23-24) To be fair, in a note at the back of the book 
Graber partially exempts "the Roman Catholic Church, the Na-
tional Right to Life Committee, and several prominent pro-life 
Republicans" from the latter charge. (p. 166 n.47) 
In an obscure paragraph Graber likewise indicts Robert 
Bork for moral obtuseness. Or at least that seems to be his point, 
as best I can make out. Here is the argument: 
Bork suggests that constitutional theorists need never explore 
why persons actually oppose abortion. "Knowledge that 
[abortion] is taking place," he declares, "can cause moral 
pain." In Bark's opinion, courts in a democracy have no au-
thority to prevent persons from enjoying the "gratification" 
that comes when bans on abortion ease this "moral pain," un-
less abortion rights are "covered specifically or by obvious im-
plication by a provision of the Constitution."48 
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(p. 24)3 Graber then goes on to castigate Bork for paying no 
attention to the source of the pain felt by those opposed to abor-
tion; it is evidently a matter of indifference to Bork, Graber as-
serts, ''whether anti-abortion activists are horrified by the death 
of unborn children, disgusted that other persons are committing 
acts that their religion regards as mortal sins, or fear that legal 
abortion will reduce the numbers, significance, and influence of 
their racial group.'' (p. 24) 
Bork's position is flawed, Graber seems to say, because it 
fails to recognize and explore some moral or perhaps constitu-
tional distinctions that right-thinking people would regard as im-
portant. Perhaps this is a deficiency in Bork's position, though 
Graber might explain why these distinctions in possible anti-
abortion motivations have constitutional significance. He 
doesn't; nor does he himself attempt any inquiry into the compli-
cated empirical question that he chastises Bork for ignoring. So 
what exactly is the relevance of Graber's criticism? One's puz-
zlement will only be enhanced if one turns to the back of the 
book and looks up endnote 48 (as few readers will), or if one 
looks up the discussion in Bork's book (as even fewer readers 
will), and discovers that in the material quoted Bork is not even 
talking about abortion. Instead, he is discussing the Griswold 
contraception case specifically, and defending an originalist ap-
proach to constitutional interpretation generally. 
In the endnote Graber justifies his bracketed insertion of 
"abortion" into the quotation because Bork "explicitly asserts 
that the same logic applies to all constitutional arguments." (p. 
166 n.48) In a sense that is true; Bork surely would not limit his 
originalist approach to questions involving contraception, and he 
applies the sort of qualified mora! skepticism expressed by his 
point about "moral pain'' and "gratification" in a general way to 
argue that judges should never appeal to moral values not 
grounded in the constitutional text. Like Graber, I have serious 
doubts about this position. Still, it seems a bit severe to fault 
Bork for not exploring some difficult questions about possible 
anti-abortion motivations without mentioning to readers, in the 
text, that Bork was not talking about abortion at all. 
It is a peripheral point, no doubt; but Graber's treatment of 
Bork is reflective of his mode of argumentation throughout the 
book. As I noted at the outset, this is advocacy scholarship. 
3. Quoting Robert H. Bork. The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of 
the Law 257-58 (Simon and Schuster, 1990). 
1996] BOOK REVIEWS 361 
The "equal choice" argument. Although criticizing familiar 
arguments for abortion rights, Graber believes that constitutional 
principles and case law decisively support a different argument 
that enjoys the added benefit of being well grounded in the facts. 
The argument might be presented as a syllogism. Its major prem-
ise asserts that the equal protection clause means that persons 
have a right to be governed under general laws that both in their 
language and their implementation treat all citizens equally, not 
discriminating on the basis of race or socioeconomic class. (p. 
76) The minor premise is that although statutes prohibiting abor-
tion have typically been nondiscriminatory on their face, in prac-
tice they were (and, if reenacted, would be) radically 
underenforced; the result is "gray markets" in which abortion is 
readily available to affluent women but much less accessible to 
poor women and women of color. (p. 84-85) It follows that the 
"law in action" unconstitutionally discriminates. (p. 77) Q.E.D. 
Students about to take a constitutional law exam and thus in 
an "issue-spotting" mode might immediately object that the ar-
gument as I have described it ignores or obscures distinctions 
that current cases and doctrine make crucial. The argument 
lumps race discrimination together with wealth discrimination, 
although current case law treats those problems very differently. 
And the argument fails to distinguish between laws that are in-
tended to burden or disfavor a protected group and laws that 
merely have a "disparate impact" on a protected group. Under 
current doctrine, the former laws presumptively violate equal 
protection but the latter do not. So existing constitutional doc-
trine seems to pose at least two serious and perhaps fatal chal-
lenges to Graber's argument. Does Graber have plausible 
responses to these challenges? 
The answer to that question, I'm afraid, is simple and plain: 
No. Graber quotes official statements asserting in sweeping 
terms that the law must protect "rich and poor" alike, (pp. 80-84) 
but he simply does not address case law mandating a very differ-
ent level of scrutiny for racial and wealth distinctions. A legally 
uninformed reader would be led to believe that constitutional 
doctrine treats race discrimination and wealth discrimination in 
the same way. 
Graber also puts off acknowledging the intentional discrimi-
nation/disparate impact problem for as long as possible. Not un-
til halfway through the book, and only after he has already laid 
out the "equal choice" argument and pronounced it to be clearly 
in accord with existing law, does he explicitly confront-or at 
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least take notice of-the "disparate impact" (p. 90-100) problem; 
and even then his discussion of the problem is quite simply mud-
dled. A general reader of this section would finish with only the 
haziest notions of who must intend what in order to establish a 
constitutional violation, or of what "intent" means in this con-
text. or of the realistic likelihood of establishing the requisite in-
tent by a showing of aggregate or statistical disparities. 
This is not to say that Graber himself misunderstands the 
law: For all I know, his discussion may be muddled by design. 
The underlying problem, I think, is that although Graber insists 
that his argument for abortion rights is distinctive by virtue of 
being grounded in facts and social realities, the social realities as 
Graber himself describes them simply do not show a violation of 
constitutional doctrine as it is currently expounded by the courts. 
In the absence of facial statutory discrimination or discriminatory 
legislative motivation, Graber would need to show that govern-
ment officials intentionally discriminated-and if given another 
chance, would discriminate-against protected classes of persons 
in enforcement of abortion statutes, as in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,4 
and his discussion does focus on enforcement. But his descrip-
tion of the social realities reveals only disparate impact, not in-
tentional discrimination. 
Although pre-Roe enforcement practices were hardly uni-
form, some recurring patterns are conspicuous. If Graber's fac-
tual presentation is accurate, abortion laws were always radically 
underenforced. Police and prosecutors often went after incom-
petent abortion practitioners who were likely to endanger their 
patients-but did not interfere with competent abortion provid-
ers, including not only doctors but also midwives and under-
ground clinics. (pp. 46-47) Thus, "[i]n most communities, state 
officials ignored and sometimes protected competent abortion-
ists; only abortionists who killed their clients were arrested." (p. 
90) In addition, officials sometimes took action against providers 
who offered abortion services to the general public but left more 
discreet private practitioners alone. And officials did not at-
tempt to second-guess the judgments of doctors who found that 
an abortion fell within a statutory exception such as "medically 
necessary." (pp. 47-50) 
As a result of this underenforcement, affluent women could 
almost always obtain abortions in hospitals, or from private phy-
sicians, or through "abortion tourism" (p. 62)-that is, traveling 
to jurisdictions where abortion was legal (although if abortion 
4. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
1996] BOOK REVIEWS 363 
was as readily available in practice as Graber suggests, it is not 
clear why this last expedient should have been necessary). Gra-
ber sometimes seems to say that poor women could also rou-
tinely obtain safe abortions, if not from physicians then from 
competent midwives and underground clinics. (pp. 46-47) Still, 
women who could not afford to have a private physician, or re-
ceive regular hospital treatment, or travel, naturally found it 
more difficult to obtain safe abortions than wealthier women did. 
It also seems entirely plausible, as Graber argues, that poorer 
and less educated women would have found it more difficult to 
satisfy procedural requirements that were imposed sometimes by 
statute but often by hospitals themselves. (pp. 55-59) 
So we can accept Graber's contention, I think, that poor wo-
men and women of color had less access to safe abortion than 
well-off white women did, and we can also accept that many of 
the officials charged with administering the laws understood this 
situation. But none of this comes close to showing that law en-
forcement officials themselves intentionally discriminated against 
poor women or women of color in the sense required by existing 
constitutional doctrine. On the contrary, the patterns of selective 
enforcement described by Graber readily suggest legitimate un-
derlying policies. 
For example, police or prosecutors not committed to eradi-
cating abortion per se might try to put incompetent or "back al-
ley" practitioners out of business in an effort to protect women 
seeking abortion from excessive risk. Thus, while leaving 
prohibitions largely unenforced, "[l]aw enforcement officials did 
occasionally make considerable efforts to prevent rank amateurs 
from performing abortions that maimed their clientele." (p. 46) 
That policy hardly seems illegitimate; indeed, it seems calculated 
to protect the poorer classes who would most likely be victimized 
by substandard practitioners. Or prosecutors with at least a weak 
commitment to discouraging abortion but unable or unwilling to 
devote a significant portion of their scarce resources to that pur-
pose might naturally attempt to prosecute providers who offer 
abortion to the general public, both because these providers are 
easier to detect and convict and because they might be perform-
ing more abortions than the typical private physician. For similar 
reasons, prosecutors might very sensibly decide not to devote 
~heir limited resources and expertise to second-guessing hospital 
JUdgments about whether particular abortions were really "medi-
cally necessary." Indeed, Graber notes that the primary impedi-
ment to more complete enforcement was a lack of evidence that 
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made prosecution next to impossible in situations in which wo-
men did not consider themselves victims. (p. 45) 
In a world of scarcity and pervasive selective enforcement, 
such policies are perfectly familiar. So it is hard, frankly, to 
credit Graber's professed inability to understand how such poli-
cies could have served objectives other than class or race discrim-
ination. And indeed, Graber readily overcomes his 
incomprehension when the immediate argument does not call for 
it. For example, his quite lengthy discussion of the "equal 
choice" argument is followed by a very brief chapter presenting a 
more "due process"-oriented argument. This argument, though 
potentially interesting, largely overlaps with the earlier one and 
is presented in conclusory fashion; given the constraints of a 
short review, I have not discussed it here. Still, it is significant 
that Graber begins this chapter, in which race and class discrimi-
nation is not as central to the argument, by observing: 
No two communities policed bans on abortion in the same 
fashion, and considerations other than racial or class prejudice 
influenced the administration of pro-life measures. . . Such 
policies did little to reduce abortion rates but did communi-
cate a communal sense that abortion (or non procreative sexu-
ality) violated societal mores. 
(p. 108) 
In short, the empirical facts as presented by Graber describe 
pervasive underenforcement but no intent by government offi-
cials to discriminate on impermissible grounds, and a more lucid 
discussion would reveal that the "equal choice" argument is un-
tenable. So perhaps Graber was in the position of the lawyer 
who thinks he has no choice except to obfuscate. Consider, for 
instance, the following argument: Graber observes that under 
civil rights statutes regulating private employment, a showing of 
disparate impact is enough to establish a prima facie violation. 
He couples this observation with a Supreme Court dictum sug-
gesting that the constitutional mandate to eliminate race discrim-
ination "is most compelling in the judicial system." From this it 
follows, according to Graber, that "police and prosecutors 
should, at a minimum, be subject to the antidiscrimination rules 
that presently govern private employers." The next paragraph 
begins with the assertion that "[t]he equal choice argument easily 
satisfies the conservative constitutional test for finding purposive 
discrimination." (p. 90) 
It takes considerable effort-more, finally, than I could mus-
ter-to take this sort of sloppy argumentation seriously. But per-
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haps Graber does not mean the argument to be taken senously 
as legal analysis. To be sure, he sometimes asserts that the equal 
choice position "relies primarily on constitutional and legal argu-
ments." (p. 77) And he repeatedly claims that his argument is 
clearly supported by existing law. (pp. 78, 90) But Graber also 
suggests at times that he is perfectly aware that this is not so. For 
instance, he essentially concedes-correctly-that his "equal 
choice" argument could not begin to satisfy the requirements of 
McKlesky v. Kemp, which rejected a much stronger claim of sys-
tematic discrimination in capital sentencing, but argues that 
McKlesky was a very bad decision-indeed, a "constitutional 
abomination" of "the Rehnquist Court." (pp. 78, 92-95) Maybe 
so, but how does this position square with Graber's contention 
that his argument "easily satisfies" even conservative constitu-
tional standards? Likewise, he admits that "the Rehnquist 
Court"-a common term of opprobrium in Graber's discussion, 
though in this instance he might have added the Burger Court, 
and the Warren Court, and every other Court to the list-"has 
shown little enthusiasm for actually restricting police or 
prosecutorial discretion." (p. 111) Same question. 
Graber sometimes describes his effort as a "rhetorical strat-
egy" (p. 10), and the most charitable course is to understand it as 
such, not as genuine legal analysis. It is clear, I think, that Gra-
ber views obvious constitutional problems in his position not as 
serious challenges to be carefully explored, but rather as irritants 
to be brushed aside. He concludes his chapter presenting the 
equal choice argument with the almost plaintive observation that 
the whole issue ought to be simple. "The simple idea is that peo-
ple should be governed by general laws. Poor persons and per-
sons of color ought to possess the same legal rights and be 
subject to the same legal sanctions as members of more privi-
leged economic classes and races." This pristine, "simple" per-
spective is spoiled only because "state officials make various 
excuses for their failure to achieve equality" -excuses that are all 
the more aggravating because "many are plausible in the ab-
stract." And "sifting through ... pro-life alibis" involves a "long, 
sometimes tedious, process." (pp. 106-07) The process is one 
that Graber never really tries to undertake. 
Graber later makes clear that he puts more stock in political 
action than in litigation as a pro-choice strategy. And he believes 
that unlike more familiar rationales based in controversial no-
tions about privacy or fundamental rights, the "equal choice" ar-
gument can serve as the centerpiece for an effective political 
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movement. His more complete recommendations for political 
organizing are presented in the book's lengthy concluding 
chapter. 
II. PRO-CHOICE STRATEGIES 
The pro-choice position, Graber contends, enjoys the sup-
port of the most powerful elites in our society; if prudently man-
aged and presented, therefore, that position "should never suffer 
electoral defeat." (p. 145) So if abortion rights are not as secure 
as they might be, that is because "NARAL, Planned Parenthood, 
and allied organizations have made errors similar to those made 
by many Union commanders" in the Civil War. (p. 142) Once 
these strategic mistakes are corrected, the future of abortion 
rights looks bright. 
And just what are the tactical blunders that need to be rem-
edied? Three errors stand out. First, the pro-choice movement 
has concentrated on influencing the judicial branch while 
neglecting the political sphere. Graber explains both why this 
strategy might have seemed attractive and what its limitations 
are. Specifically, the Reagan-Bush era proved that a determined 
administration can fill the Supreme Court with pro-life justices-
Graber seems to view the current Court as being "packed with 
anti-Roe jurists" (p. 128)-and "jurists appointed on the basis of 
their presumed anti-Roe beliefs" are not likely to alter their 
views even as political winds change. (p. 129) 
To be sure, one might have supposed that the Reagan-Bush 
experience proved just the opposite. Isn't Roe still pretty much 
intact? And weren't all three of the authors of the famous Casey 
Joint Opinion that saved Roe-Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and 
Souter-Reagan-Bush appointees? But this is my doubt, not 
Graber's; he notices the question in a sentence and a brief 
endnote (p. 130), but quickly suggests that these justices' votes 
can be attributed to respect for precedent or to a desire to en-
hance the Republicans' political prospects. These explanations 
are evidently not regarded as in tension with the claim that jus-
tices appointed on the basis of presumed anti-Roe views will al-
most never disappoint their pro-life appointers. 
A second error is that even when abortion rights proponents 
have organized for political, as opposed to legal, action they have 
usually adopted a sort of "Rainbow Coalition" strategy, trying to 
mobilize women, the poor, and minorities in support of pro-
choice policies. But this strategy is misguided, Graber argues, 
because the empirical evidence overwhelmingly shows that these 
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constituencies are precisely the ones most likely to favor restric-
tions on abortion. (pp. 136-44) Beyond noting that such people 
are often less educated and more religious than the general pop-
ulation, Graber does not pause to wonder just why the groups 
that in his view are the principal victims of abortion restrictions 
nonetheless favor such restrictions, nor does he consider whether 
there might be something disturbingly paternalistic about pro-
tecting these groups from ostensible discrimination by promoting 
a policy they apparently do not favor. If women, the poor, and 
racial minorities don't understand their own true interests, evi-
dently, then someone else will just have to step in to protect 
those interests for them. The bottom line is that support for pro-
choice positions resides mostly with elites-"males, whites, and 
persons of high socioeconomic status," especially professionals 
such as media personnel, academicians, and lawyers (pp. 142-
47)-and pro-choice political efforts should accordingly be aimed 
at these groups. 
Finally, and most basically, pro-choice advocates have often 
tried to politicize the issue of abortion in a pro-choice direction 
when their fundamental strategy should be to depoliticize the is-
sue. Abortion rights represent the status quo, after all, and will 
continue to do so even if Roe is overruled. And most politicians, 
excepting only those most strongly committed to pro-life views, 
would much prefer to do nothing about the matter. So political 
inertia is strong in this context. It follows that if the issue could 
simply be taken off the political agenda, abortion rights would be 
secure. 
But how can an issue so divisive be depoliticized? Graber 
has a variety of suggestions. Abortion rights proponents ought 
to spend less time and money helping pro-choice candidates win, 
and instead should focus their efforts on ensuring that pro-life 
candidates lose. A similar strategy applies to judicial appoint-
ments. Since lawyers belong to an elite that strongly favors abor-
tion rights, potential appointees who have not publicly taken any 
stand on abortion are very likely to be pro-choice. Hence, pro-
choice people should insist on selection criteria that merely de-
mand that appointees have given no previous indication of any 
stance regarding abortion; such criteria will "seem perfectly fair" 
but will nonetheless ensure that most judges are pro-choice. (pp. 
148-49) 
Graber's analysis describes what might seem a misalignment 
in political parties-support for abortion rights comes most 
strongly from the well-off, who nonetheless often prefer Republi-
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can economic policies-but in the interest of depoliticization he 
discourages any effort to produce a more consistent alignment 
that might make abortion a more central aspect of any party's 
platform. Consequently, pro-choice Republicans figure centrally 
in Graber's plans. Faced with a pro-life Republican candidate, 
these liberal Republicans should of course vote for the Demo-
crat. Usually, though, "such persons must stay in the Republican 
Party" since "defecting to the Democrats" might lead to a 
stronger Republican identification with the pro-life view. (pp. 
150-51) This recommendation might place pro-choice Republi-
cans in an awkward situation, but they can reduce their difficul-
ties by focusing on the primaries, which "may prove a 
particularly good forum for punishing politicians who oppose 
legal abortion." (p. 149) 
Graber is sanguine about pro-choice prospects if these rec-
ommendations are adopted. Early in his strategy discussion he 
offers a sort of "I Have a Dream" vision of the year 2012. In 
Graber's scenario, the White House has been occupied for four 
presidential terms by Mario Cuomo and Patricia Schroeder. 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg is the Chief Justice. Federal legislation 
commands all medical recipients of federal funds to provide 
abortion on demand. In this future scenario, Webster-a 1989 
decision that in this part of the book Graber describes as signal-
ing an "abrupt halt" to "fj]udicial solicitude for abortion rights" 
(p. 127) (though he elsewhere argues that the very limited restric-
tions it and similar cases approved have had virtually no effect on 
the availability of abortion) (pp. 5, 7)-and "the pro-life move-
ment are discussed in the same way as Dred Scott v. Sanford and 
the pro-slavery movement." And "[t]he few remaining pro-life 
advocates are confined to the lunatic fringes of American poli-
tics." (pp. 134-35) 
This "futuristic vision," as he calls it, is not so fantastic. On 
the contrary, with greater effort and better strategic planning it 
might have been realized already; the vision "illustrates just how 
secure legal abortion would be had proponents of reproductive 
choice conducted successful electoral campaigns as well as suc-
cessful litigation campaigns." (p. 135) With the proper tactical 
corrections, there is no reason why the vision cannot be realized 
in the near future. A curious wrinkle might be noted here: Gra-
ber himself claims more than once to be "weakly pro-life." (pp. 
162 n.l9, 159) Does this mean that if Graber's prescriptions are 
heeded, then in the year 2012 he himself will be one of those 
confined to "the lunatic fringe"? But like Graber's legal analysis, 
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the question need not be taken seriously: I think we can be confi-
dent that Mark Graber will have no trouble adapting. 
III. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS 
At the heart of Graber's book lies a disturbing paradox: 
Anti-abortion laws did not-and if we project the pre-Roe situa-
tion forward, as Graber does-would not have any very signifi-
cant effect on the number of unborn lives saved. Nor did, or 
would, such restrictions significantly affect the actual availability 
of abortion, especially for those classes who care most about 
abortion rights. To be sure, either the description or the predic-
tion might be wrong. For example, Graber says that after Roe 
the cost of obtaining an abortion dropped dramatically-to less 
than a third of the former price (p. 67)-and an economist might 
wonder whether the demand for abortion was so inelastic that a 
price change of this kind would have no discernible effect. And 
Graber's predictions do not fully take account of the fact that 
given the powerful pro-life concern that has developed since Roe, 
future restrictions might be enforced more rigorously, at least in 
states where pro-life sentiment is powerful enough to enact such 
laws in the first place. Still, suppose Graber is right: Why then 
has the issue of abortion so traumatized the nation? Although 
Graber's efforts to transform the paradox into a convincing con-
stitutional argument fail, the paradox nonetheless generates im-
portant and fascinating questions. 
A natural implication of Graber's diagnosis, one might sup-
pose, is that communities or states maintained abortion laws 
largely for symbolic reasons. At one point Graber says as much: 
"Such policies did little to reduce abortion rates but did commu-
nicate a communal sense that abortion (or non procreative sexu-
ality) violated societal mores." (p. 108) For Graber this is the 
end of the inquiry; his implicit assumption throughout is that 
communicating such a message about societal mores is not a le-
gitimate purpose that could serve to sustain a law. 
His failure to go further is unfortunate, I think, because im-
portant questions, both sociological and jurisprudential, are im-
plicated. What exactly is going on in the debate that seemingly 
divides and energizes the country more than any other? Why do 
Americans care so passionately about the symbolism of this par-
ticular issue? And is it proper for communities to enact criminal 
laws that serve mainly symbolic functions? 
On the one hand, such laws are hardly unfamiliar. Indeed, 
the symbolic or educative function of law is a common jurispru-
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dential topic. Supreme Court decisions from Brown to recent 
"endorsement" cases under the establishment clause have some-
times attached as much significance, or more, to the symbolism 
of laws as to their more tangible or material consequences. On 
the other hand, symbolic but largely unenforced laws strain the 
concept of "rule of law" as understood by thoughtful expositors 
like Lon Fuller, for whom "congruence between official action 
and declared rule" was an essential part of the "internal moral-
ity" of law.s Could a sensible and workable constitutional frame-
work be developed for assessing such largely unenforced but 
symbolically significant laws? 
At some point the sociological and jurisprudential questions 
converge. Law by its nature claims authority, and authority has 
both a sociological and jurisprudential dimension. A govern-
ment without justice, as Augustine observed long ago, is not 
much more than a group of bandits operating on a large scale.6 
So citizens might decline to ascribe authority to a government 
that officially endorses practices they regard as deeply immoral, 
even if they also realize that in a pervasively imperfect world 
such practices are likely to-and perhaps even, in some tragic 
sense, need to-flourish anyway. And indeed, people are some-
times heard to say that a law, or a government, that officially 
refuses to honor the sacred value of life is unworthy of respect. 
In a complicated and obscure way, something like this concept 
seems to have been in the background of largely unenforced 
prohibitions on abortion. Similar sensibilities may be at work in 
the repugnance felt by many towards Roe even if the prospects 
for actually eradicating abortion seem next to nil. 
A book purportedly devoted to Rethinking Abortion with 
careful attention to social realities might properly reflect on such 
questions. It often seems that Graber's discussion cannot help 
but lead him into a consideration of some of these issues; but in 
the end he manages to skip past them. Thus, for Graber, the 
complex and perhaps confused sensibilities that I have awk-
wardly tried to describe are pretty much reducible to "the igno-
rance and hypocrisy of the majority," and their significance is 
that they pose "a threat ... to a just democratic order." (p. 160) 
In fact, attempts to restrict abortion, past and present, are largely 
traceable to just such "ignorance and hypocrisy." Graber's clos-
5. Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 81 (Yale U. Press, rev. ed., 1969). 
6. St. Augustine, 1 The City of God, ch. 4.4 at 117-18 (John Grant, 1909). 
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ing paragraph conveys his assessment of this situation: "Abortion 
issues deserve a more honest and intelligent debate." (p. 160) 
Amen. 
